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The abna' al-dawla: The Definition and Legitimation of
Identity in Response to the Fourth Fitna
JOHNP. TURNER
KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY

This article will reopen the question about the identity and provenance of the abna' aldawla. Who were they? When did they form as a collective and why? The standardview is
that the abna' al-dawla were the backbone of the Abbasid dynasty, coming into existence
with that regime after the revolution circa 132/750 and consisting of the original fighters
from Khurasanand their descendants, who formed an elite social and political structureof
supporters. This privileged status accorded them the moniker abnd' al-dawla (sons/supportersof the dynasty).
Recent scholarshipon premodernIslamic history typically allows modernconceptualizations of identity to determinethe understandingof group dynamics and identity formation.
However, these typically are not applicable to the third/ninthcentury.' The abnd' al-dawla
are particularlyin need of reinterpretation.2Still, determining who they were presents a
numberof difficulties. The blanket term abnd', as it is most often used, leaves little room,
in its monolithic presentationas an ethnic or nationality based group, for the subtleties of
social interaction.One must not forget that the abnd' al-dawla as a political actorwas made
up of individualswith many otherties of identity.In the course of this articleI will show that
it was duringthe fourthfitna(195/810-198/813) that these individualsformed an identity for
collective action. This is not based on ethnic or nationalaffinity.Reading the sources closely
reveals that they do not appear as a coherent group until that conflict, and they disappear
shortly thereafter.
Scholars have taken a variety of terms as synonymous with abnd' al-dawla that actually
are not. When the military units were settled in Baghdadat its founding, they were grouped
roughly by region of origin representinga great diversity of locales.3 Garrisoningtroops in
this mannerdoes not necessarily translateinto settlement by ethnic or national identity, nor
does it lead to the creationof these identities.4When hostilities broke out between al-Amin
An early version of this article was presented to the 1999 annual meeting of MESA. Subsequently revised, it
appearedin my "Inquisitionand the Definition of Identity in Early Abbasid History" (Ph.D. diss., University of
Michigan, 2001). The present article draws upon both of those but has changed significantly due to helpful comments and criticisms at each previous stage.
1. See M. Rowlands, "The Politics of Identity in Archaeology,"in Social Constructionof the Past, ed. G. C.
Bond and A. Gilliam (London: Routledge, 1994), 130; also D. McCrone, The Sociology of Nationalism (London:
Routledge, 1998), 23-24.
2. Crone notes in reference to several individuals, "They are often described as Abnd' in the secondaryliterature,but this merely goes to show that modem scholarsroutinelyextend the Banawi label to all offspringof the participantsin the revolution."P. Crone, "The CAbbasid
AbniA and Sasanid Cavalrymen,"Journal of the Royal Asiatic
Society 8 (1998): 5.
3. M. Sharon,Revolt: The Social and Military Aspects of the 'AbbasidRevolution (Jerusalem:Hebrew Univ.,
1990), 263-301.
4. McCrone,Sociology ofNationalism, 23. "Suchidentifiersof ethnicity,however, do not automaticallygenerate an 'identity,'because the key will be how an individualchooses to identify with these characteristics.'Identity'
is perception.If a particularidentity does not mean anythingto the populationin question, this populationdoes not
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and al-Ma'mun,individualsrose to fight based on horizontalties of loyalty, which focused
vertically on the caliph and anti-caliph.These ties were not based on a sharedsense of ethnicity or nationalismbut ratheron linkages of local commonality,meaningquarters,bonds of
patronage, and perceptions of common interests. In the process of asserting a threat or in
responding to it, the various players on the field were forced to seek justification for their
places and roles. They were Khurasanians(al-Ma'mlin'sforces mostly from Khurasan)facing
people whose familial roots were in Khurasanbut who resided in Baghdad.5The defining
connectionfor the abn-' al-dawla was location in Baghdad.They were proudof having come
but theiruse of the term clearly
from Khurasanand claimed some sense of "Khurasaniness,"
excluded Tahirand the forces of al-Ma'miin.One side actively tried to dissociate itself from
the other.6In this process of dissociation, the abna' al-dawla came to define themselves in
opposition to the others, who happenedto be the rabbleof Baghdadand the followers of alMa'mtinwho was proclaiminga new da'wa. The latterwere fighting for the new da'wa and
were held togetherby their own special ties of loyalty and patronage.Al-Ma'mtin'sprimary
general,Tdhirb. al-IHusayn,exhortshis troops:"Ohfriendsof God andpeople of fidelity and
gratitude,verily you arenot such as those you see of the people of faithlessness and treason.
They neglected what you preserved.They belittledwhat you esteemed.They were faithless to
the oaths that you guarded.. .",7At the same time elite membersof Baghdadsociety sought
justification for their place by asserting that they were the abnd' al-dawla, sons of the first
supportersof the original da'wa, tightly connected to the caliph and to the Abbasid household. Within the Baghdad milieu, the vertical bonds of loyalty and assertion of ties to the
Caliph and caliphal household broughtdisparateindividualsinto a largerbody for collective
action. The new da'wa of al-Ma'miin,the approachof his forces and the siege, caused the
abna' al-dawla to coalesce in an assertionof their unique position. However, their interests
and loyalties were too diffuse to form an effective, unified militarybody, especially once the
unifying identifierand its utility had been removed. This political subscriptionto an identity
by a groupof militarysupportersof the Abbasidcaliphatewas definedby focusing on, and in
termsof, "historical"loyalty to thatcaliphateandthe caliphate's"historical"ties to them. The
idiom in which they chose to express this allows for the description of a collective grouping but not of one that was as pervasive, cohesive, or as old as has been assumed.
PREVIOUS DEFINITIONS

In 1964, David Ayalonpresentedthe paper"TheMilitaryReformsof Caliphal-Mu'tasim,"
which even though it was not formally published until thirtyyears later, has set the tone for
the field and its understandingof the abnd' al-dawla and consequentlyof early Abbasidhistory.8Even thoughunpublished,it was passed aroundand took on an almost primarysource-

have this particularidentity.'" And p. 28: "The key point here is that there is no one-to-one relationshipbetween
ethnicity and culturalidentifiers.Whatmattersis which ones key actorsregardas significant,for which purposesand
under which conditions."And quoting Eriksen on the same page "It is only when they make a difference that cultural differences are importantin the creationof ethnic boundaries."
5. An analogous situationwould be the American colonists vs. the British in the American Revolution.
6. See M. Bonner, "Definitionsof Povertyandthe Rise of the Muslim UrbanPoor,"Journalof the Royal Asiatic
Society 6 (1996): 336.
7. Abti JacfarMuhammadb. Jariral-Tabari,Ta'rikhal-rusul wa'l-multlik,ed. M. J. de Goeje, 15 vols. (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1879), 3: 823.15-17.
in Islam and the Abode of War(Norfolk: Variorum,
8. Ayalon, "The MilitaryReforms of Caliph al-MuCtasim,"
1994).
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like status.Brilliantin its erudition,Ayalon's fundamentalunderstandingof the group and its
social dynamic is nevertheless flawed because of his assumptions about their national and
ethnic identity which led to the notion that it was a coherent political actor from the beginning-an interpretationthat has become the norm.
Ayalon's definition of the abna' as "the descendantsof the Khurasinis who broughtthe
'Abbasidsto the throne, and who included both Iraniansand Arabs"forms a foundationfor
almost all studies of the early Abbasids.9He considers the abna' to have been an ethnically
based coterie, which was then transplantedto Baghdad.This means that while the Arabs and
the Iranianswere "racially"distinct from each other, they felt, by virtue of their common
origin in Khurasan,an ethnic unity. In the course of his article, Ayalon highlights the tribal
struggles out of which Abu Muslim and his fighters emerged as victors. He then compares
this with the armyof al-Ma'miin,which he says was made up of "racialelements"that were
definitely not Arab.10In 1990 Moshe Sharonrefinedthis by addingthat the original Abbasid
army was much more diverse than Ayalon allows. The limiting factor was, according to
Sharon,registrationaccordingto village and not by tribe.1' For Ayalon the leadershipcadre
of the Abbasid revolution was made up of Arabs who had migrated to Khurasan.12However he also reads the abnd' as having explicit ties to each other and to their home region of
Khurasanbased on their common "national"origin.13Amikam Elad goes one step further
by stating that the Abbasid military was mostly made up of Arabs from the southerntribes
who lived in Khurasan.Thus, they did not representa resurgenceof and takeover of the caliphate by Persians. He assumes the continuity and coherence of their identity as abnal'aldawla, but states that they were not Iranians.14Patricia Crone, in her review of Mohsen
Zakeri's book, deals skillfully with his theory that the abnd' were the descendants of the
Sasanian horsemen of KhusrawI. She cuts to the heart of the matterby making the observation that "the Abnd' of the 'Abbasids owed their name to their descent from the participantsin the revolution"and that"therecan have been no Abnd' in this sense before the dawla
took place."'" Underlying each of these are basic assumptions that are rooted in Ayalon's
article.
Returningto Ayalon's definition, he notes that they are described as being Baghdadiand
quite proudof this, yet at the same time they highlightedtheirKhurasanianorigins. Therefore
the abnda'felt strong, visceral connections to their home region and their "nationalbrothers"
living there. Ayalon posits the hypothesis that when Baghdad was built, the Khurasanian
troops were all settled in it as an elite corps and their children and grandchildrenenjoyed
special status and treatmentowing to their heritage as early advocates from Khurasan.16
Theirethnic identitybound them together.For Ayalon, this identitywas based on their shared
Arab racial descent which had been turnedinto a pseudo-Iranianethnicity that had deepened
because of their common locality in Baghdad and their status as a military aristocracy,an
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Ayalon, "MilitaryReforms,"6.
Ibid., 5.
Sharon,Revolt, 263-301; although not all of the units were so registered.
Ayalon, "MilitaryReforms,"38.
Ibid., 8.
Elad, "Aspectsof the Transitionfrom the Umayyad to the <AbbhsidCaliphate,"Jerusalem Studies in Arabic

and Islam 19 (1995): 89-132.

15. Crone,"CAbbhsid
Abn',"' 3; G. Le Strange,Baghdad during the Abbasid Caliphate(London:CurzonPress,
1972), 128. Le Strange, much earlier, describes the abni' as "Persiannobles" "who were already settled in Mesopotamia at the time of the Moslim conquest."
16. Ayalon, "MilitaryReforms,"8. His conjecturehas become canonical.
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Arabized ethnic group, racially Arab but culturallyKhurasanian.Ayalon thus observes that
even though they had this distinct connection with Khurasanand pride in this, they are described in the sources as being differentfrom Khurasanians.17In addition, he interpretsthe
abna' as clearly separatefrom the Arabs.18He and othersareespecially boundto the national
characterof this clique. Elton Daniel says "they had been able to forge and to maintainthe
revolutionary coalition by appealing to feelings of Khurasanianparticularismand a vague
form of shi'ism."19Croneremarksthat "generally,the Abna' were the bodily, as opposed to
institutional,descendantsof the participantsin the revolution"20and in a laterwork that "the
However she does allow that the abnd'
sources regularly identified Iranians as Abncd'."21
were not wholly "Iranian"or "Arab"but that they were a mixture.22Jacob Lassner argues
that there is a clear connection between "theabna' and Khurasanand, hence, a link between
the abni' and the Turks"and that the abni' were the "second generation"of Abbasid revolutionaries.23 Crone goes so far as to say "the Abnd~had been designed as an imperial
aristocracy."24More recently, she has contrastedthem with "Tahir's'ajam [who] were raw
Iranians,people who had failed to transcendtheir local origins by participationin the high
culture."25This all seems fairly straightforwardbut Ayalon makes three observations that
are particularlytelling and have been largely ignored:
1. The Abnd'arehardlymentionedbeforethe strugglebetweenAminandMa'mtin.Therefore,theperiodof theirformationandtakingshapeis completelyobscure.
2. Neverin theirhistorywerethe Abna'as activeas duringthatstruggle.
3. TheAbnd'arestationedexclusively,or almostexclusively,in Baghdad.Practicallyall the
on themin the chronicles,eitherduringthe struggleor afterit, is confinedto that
information
city.26
TERMINOLOGY

As the preceding discussion shows, in the secondary literaturethe term abnd' has been
reified as if it had been in common parlance from the beginning of the Abbasid revolution
to signify a group founded on almost nationalistic terms. In reality, as Ayalon has partially
admitted,the term does not appearin use in this form before the war between al-Amin and
al-Ma'miin.Scholars have assumedthat a multiplicity of terms indicate the abnd' al-dawla,
which upon examinationdo not. Crone states that references to them began duringthe reign
of al-Rashid and that "by far the most common term for the Abbasid troops, whatever their

17. Ibid., 19.
18. Ibid. Concerningthe zawaqil incidentAyalon notes that "thisis the only occasion on which Khurasanitroops
are mentioned as fighting for Amin"; see al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 844-45; also Ayalon, "MilitaryReforms,"12.
19. Daniel, The Political and Social History of Khurasan Under Abbasid Rule 747-820 (Minneapolis:Bibliotheca Islamica, 1979), 58.
20. Crone,Slaves on Horses: TheEvolutionof the Islamic Polity (Cambridge:CambridgeUniv. Press, 1980), 66.
21. Crone, "'AbbasidAbnd',"7.
22. Ibid., 11.
23. Lassner, The Shaping of 'AbbdsidRule (Princeton:PrincetonUniv. Press, 1980), 131, 133. Crone picks up
the notion that they were the second generationand deploys it with great effectiveness; "The Abbisid Abnr',"3.
24. Crone, Slaves on Horses, 73.
25. "'AbbasidAbna',"14. It is unfortunatethatCronechooses to encode this in terms of nationalistidentity,because it is not an essentialized thing that al-Ma'mtin'ssupporterswere all "Iranians,"Persians, Turks,or anything
else. The assertionbeing made was that they were outsidersto the community.
26. Ayalon, "MilitaryReforms,"7. Lassner, Shaping, 133-34, states that "the only certain claim that can be
made for the abnd', before the great civil war between the brothers,is that they are Baghdadisdescended from the
KhurSisaniswho come to Iraq with the advance of the revolution."
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generationis ahl khurasan."27It is generally assumed that the terms, "abnd' rijal al-dawla,
baqiyyatrijal al-da'wa, abnd' ahl khurdsdn,abnd' khurasdn,abna' al-jundal-khurasaniyya,"
are synonyms of abna' al-dawla, without readingcarefully to see if they in fact are.28In the
same way that the thirteenth-centuryNorman rulers of England are often described as English,29we expect to find the abna' in these termsand so we have. Interestingly,Croneshows
how abna' of various groups are not identical and that the term abnd' can indicate a great
range of diversity.30Before proceeding,we should considerthese terms and our assumptions
abouttheir meanings. A useful place to begin is with a perceived problemwith orthography.
Ayalon remarks,"the sources frequentlydistortabna' to anbar and abnawi to anbari."'31
Other scholars have taken this to be a truism.32Perhaps Ayalon's desire to see them as a
group and this term as referringto the abnd' distractedhim. Anbarclearly designates a place
and al-Anbariis the nisba for thatplace. Located approximatelysixty kilometersfrom Baghruled from there for five years.33Of course Ayalon was too careful a scholar
dad,
to have
missed this. Whathe has done is to assume that the abnc' as a core elite were already
al-Saff.h
in existence. They went where the caliph went and because
had been therewith his
al-Saff.h with Abnawi. Consider
Khurasanianforces, the term Anbari must thereforebe synonymous
that al-Yacqtibirelates:"andwhile Abti Jacfarwas on the pilgrimage, EIsab. 'Ali received the
oath from whomeverwas from al-Hashimiyya34and the commandersfrom al-Anbar... then
Abt Muslim and whoever was present from al-Hashimiyya and the commanderstook the
oath."35Before the founding of Baghdad, al-Saffah had been ruling from Anbar and naturally these people are designated as living in and being part of the capital. Also notice that
those who are from al-Hashimiyya,where al-Mansuirhad ensconced his supporters,are given
the nisba Hishimiyya. This designation, as a parallel, indicates that al-Anbari is a correct
usage.36 More tellingly, al-Yacqubiin his Kitdb al-Bulddn informs us that the Anbari secretaries were settled in Baghdad.37
Elad notes that the person named, CAbdawayhal-Anbari, is the victim of "a common
The latter's name should be al-Abndwi,but al-Anbarihas been suborthographicalerror."38
stitutedby mistake. However, Elad does not producean instance where the name is rendered
as al-Abnawl.39Crone manages to produce a case of the latter that occurs after the fourth
27. "'AbbSsidAbnf'l" 3.
28. Ibid.
29. B. Anderson,Imagined Communities(New York:Verso, 1991), 118.
30. "'Abbdsid
2-3.
Abn'•,
31. Ayalon, "MilitaryReforms,"33.
32. Crone, "cAbbasidAbnr',"9 n. 82: "The Muslim b. Nasr al-A'war al-Anbariwho appearssat Barqain the
time of al-Ma'mfinwas presumablyalso an Abndwi."
33. J. Lassner, The Topographyof Baghdad (Detroit:Wayne State Univ. Press, 1970), 123. He says that it was
the capital for only a short time; however, see al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 89, 91-93 (Abti Muslim leaves and takes with
him all of the commandersin Anbar);99, 271 (Al-Mansilrmoves the capital from Anbar to al-Hgshimiyyawhere
he and his followers had alreadysettled). Abil Hanifa Ahmad b. Ddwild al-Dinawari,Kitdb al-Akhbaral-tiwdl, ed.
Abd al-MunimAmir (Cairo: 1960), 390, also shows al-Rashidspending time in Anbar, bypassing Baghdad.
34. Al-Mansiirhad housed his supportershere duringthe reign of al-Saffah.Upon ascension he located his capital here for five years before he moved to Baghdad.See al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 129, 182, 188, 271.
35. Ahmadb. Abi Ya'qib b. Jacfaral-Yacqibi,al-Ta'rikh,ed. M. T. Houtsma,2 vols. (Leiden:E. J. Brill, 1883),
2: 437.
36. Hfshimiyya is also a tribal nisba, but here it clearly indicates a locality.
37. Ahmad b. Abi Yaqfilbb. Ja'faral-Ya'qtibi,Kitab al-Buldan, ed. M. J. de Goeje (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1892),
245-46. Cited by H. Kennedy, The Armies of the Caliphs (New York:Routledge, 2001), 84.
38. "Aspectsof the Transition,"99 n. 47.
39. In all of the texts to which he refers, the individual'sname is given either with the nisba al-anbart or with
none. Al-Tabarl,Ta'rikh,3: 630, clearly renderedas al-anbdrt,p. 1035.7, no nisba is given. Izz al-Din Ibn al-Athir,
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fitna.40 She also cites a few instancesin additionto those cited by Elad which she assumes in-

dicate that he is Abnawi,but which in fact do not.41The renderingal-Anbari is not an orthographicerror.'Abdawayhis Anbari, "fromthe city of Anbar."This does not necessarilymean
thathe is Abnawi. The two terms are not interchangeable,nor can we say thatit is merely the
slip of a copyist's hand that has renderedhim such. It appearsfar too consistently. If one is
going to assume that a deviationhas occurred,then the preponderanceof the evidence points
in the opposite direction, that of al-Abnawi being a mistaken renderingof al-Anbari.
Elad also states in the same footnote that the well-known 'Abd al-Rahmanb. Jabala alAbndwi is sometimes referredto as al-Anbari and cites al-Tabarias evidence that this is a
mistake.42However, the manuscriptsays al-Anbari.The editor in the Addendaet emendana
suggests replacing it with al-Abnawi,but the source in its original form identifies him as alAnbari. This case deserves furtherconsideration,because in al-Tabarireferencesto this figure
identify him as both al-Anbdri and al-Abnawi. He appears three times with the nisba alAnbari, under the years 185/801, 195/811.43The last time is a brief mention of when he is
sent by al-Amin to fight Tdhir.Thereafterhis name shifts to al-Abnawi.The firstreferenceas
al-Abnawi occurs during the year 195/811 as part of a fuller description of his campaign
against Tdhir.44However, we should compare this passage with some equivalent passages:
al-Tabari: wajjaha 'Abd al-Rahman al-abndwifit 'ishrin alf rajul min al-abnd'45

Ibn al-Athir:wajjaha 'Abdal-Rahmanb. Jabala al-anbdrift 'ishrin alf rajulnahwa Hamadhan46

Was Ibn al-Athircorrectingwhat he perceived to be a mistake in al-Tabari?Admittedly Ibn
al-Athiris a much later source, but there is anotherearly parallel in the FragmentaHistoricum Arabicorumwhich takes a slightly, though informatively,differentform:
inna al-Aminqad naffadha'Abdal-Rahmanb. Jabala al-anbdriild Hamadhanwa qad intakhaba
la-hu 'ishrin alf rajul min al-anbdr47

al-Kamilfli'l-ta'rikh, ed. CAbdal-Wahhdbal-Najdr(Cairo:Iddratal-Tibd'aal-Muniriya,1929), 5: 95; he appearsas
al-anbiri. KhalifaIbn Khayy t al-'Usfuri,Ta'rikhKhalifab. Khayytt, ed. S. Zakkar(Damascus:Wizdratal-Thaqdfa
wa'l-Irshddal-Qawmi, 1967), 2: 748; only the name CAbdawayh
appears.Ahmad b. YahydBalddhuri,Kitab Futih
al-buldan, ed. M. J. DeGoeje (Leiden:E. J. Brill, 1866), 296.3-4; again, only the name CAbdawayh
appears,but in
this case is encoded as "minwujiuhahl al-dawla."
40. "cAbbdsidAbni'," 8 n. 68: in Muhammadb. Yisuf Kindi, The Governorsand Judges of Egypt, ed. R. Guest
and A. A. al-Askalami (London:Luzac and Co., 1912), 183.7-8, he is noted (in the year 212/827) as al-abnawl. In
the same note Croneconsidersthe case of 'Ali b. Jabala.In referenceto this individual,a relativeof CAbdal-Rahmdn
b. Jabala,in al-al-Tabariand al-Balddhurino nisba is given. However, in the Abli al-FarajIsfahdni,al-Aghini, 24
vols. (Cairo: Dir al-Kutub al-Misri, 1927-1974), 20: 14, he is described as "minabnd' al-shi'a al-khurdsdniyya
min ahl Baghdad." Keep in mind, I am not arguing that the abnd' did not exist or that they were not what they
claimed to be.
41. Appearsas Abdalldhb. al-Jartidin al-Ya'qilbi,al-Ta'rikh,2: 496; also Ibn'Idharial-Marrakushi,Histoire de
l'Afriquedu Nord et de l'Espagne musulmane,ed. E. Levi-Provencal,2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1948), 1: 86ff.
42. "Aspectsof the Transition,"99 n. 47; al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 650.
43. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 650, 798-99, 804; on p. 773 and in al-Ya'qtibi,al-Ta'rikh,2: 532, he appearswithout
nisba.
44. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 826.18-827.1, 827.16-17. There are two accountsof his being dispatchedto fight Tihir in al-Tabari.Also see p. 804. I will discuss this point below.
45. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 826.18-827.1
46. Ibn al-Athir,al-Kaimil,5: 146.5-6. He is again identified as al-Anbariin line 24.
47. M. J. De Goeje, Fragmentahistoricumarabicorum,2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1869), 325.9. Throughout
this text Anbhr/Anbdriappearwhere underthe old paradigmone expects to find abnd'. In one instance (p. 321.11)
abnd' appears,but as abnd' al-muluk.
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Given that the Fragmenta is usually quite close to the text of al-Tabari,the variationis significant. Al-Tabari's first mention of 'Abd al-Rahmanbeing sent out to fight Tahir renders
him as al-Anbari, indicating that his name was in flux and that the assertion under the year
195/811 that he is al-Abndwiis an ideological identification.48In al-Dinawarihe is also designated al-Abndwi in the same context of his march to meet Tahir in battle.49The second
episode in which he appearsas al-Abnawlin al-Tabarioccurs in the accountof his battlewith
Tahir, also in 195/811.50 The final reference occurs under the year 196/812 when his death
is reportedto al-Ma'min.51 Prior to the fourthfitna, before he is dispatched against Tahir,
he is referredto as al-Anbari. During the fourthfitna when he leads the troops againstTahir,
his name changes to al-Abnawi.The timing of this shift fits perfectly within my paradigmof
the rise of the collective identity during the fourthfitna in response to al-Malmlin'sthreat.
Because scholars assume that a person must be Abnawi, they have ignored the majorityof
the evidence that rendersboth 'Abdawayhand CAbdal-Rahmanas al-Anbari. Again, if one
were going to arguethat an orthographicerrorhas occurred,one would have to arguethatthe
occurrences of al-Abnawl are a mistake.
Now let us turnto the interpretationof terms. Ayalon states: "thata conjunctionbetween
two terms does not necessarily imply that the terms are differentin meaning, can be learnt
from phrases like: Ahl Baghdad wal-HIarbiyya;al-Jund min al-Harbiyya wal-Baghdadiyyin
... al-Abna' wa-AhlBaghdad ... al-Jund wal-Abnai'."52
All of these referencesare found in
al-Tabariunderthe years 196/812 or 201/816, in the throesof the fourthfitnaand afterwards.
The reference to ahl Baghdad wal-Harbiyya; al-Jund min al-Harbiyya wal-Baghdadiyyin
occurs under the year 201/816. However, there is a distinction made between these groups.
rose againstthem and exFurtherdown the page from thatreferencewe read:"The
.Harbiyya
ruler in Baghdad. Then the
pelled them and made Ishiq b. Musa b. al-Mahdi al-Ma'muin's
people from both sides [of the river] gathered and agreed about this."53Here, the ahl Harbiyya and the ahl Baghdad (indicatedas the ahl-janibayn)are clearly different.The ahl Harbiyya was a subset of the ahl Baghdad. The phrase al-abnd' wa-ahl Baghdad that Ayalon
quotes occurs under 196/812. Here too a distinction is made: "He mentioned that the abnd'
and people of Baghdadmet him with honor and exaltation. They erected tents for him, and
the commanders,chiefs, and nobles went out to meet him."54The use of the definitearticlein
"theabnd'"'and the lack of it with "people of Baghdad"indicates that abnd' is also a subset
of a largergrouping.The thirdreferenceAyalon uses occurs underthe same year. Thatreference reads, "he dispatched with him a guard from the army and the abnd-'."55The guardis
made up of soldiers from the regular army and from the abnd', two different entities.
In much the same vein, Elad argues that
the prominentmenof the'AbbfisidDa'wa, who werealso the seniorcommandersof the Ahl

Khurasan,were called al-Shi'a, Shi'at ahl-Khurasan,or sometimes Shi'at amir al-Mu'minin.In
later periods their sons and descendants were called (among other epithets) Abnd' al-Shi'a. It

48. Cf. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 804.6 (al-Anbart);also 3: 826-29 (al-Abndwt).
49. al-Dinawari,Kitaibal-Akhbar,398.15, 21. Unfortunately,he does not appearearlierin the text for comparison.
50. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 831-33; on 832 he is eulogized as 'Abd al-Rahmanb. Jabalaal-Abnawl.
51. Ibid., 841.8.
52. "Military Reforms," 32. In spite of this assertion, he chooses to read the conjunction "al-abnd' wa ahl
khurasan"as indicating two distinct groups. See al-Tabari,Ta'rtkh,3: 844.
53. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 998.20-999.2.
54. al-Tabari,The Warbetween Brothers, trans.M. Fishbein, vol. 31 (Albany: State Univ. of New YorkPress,
1992), 109 with slight modification;al-Tabari,Ta'rtkh,3: 846.13-14.
55. al-Tabari, Ta'rikh, 3: 842.20.
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was customaryto addthe "nickname"
for the
al-Shi'a,to the smallnumberof propagandists
causein Khurdsdn.56
CAbbdsid

He equates these with the ahl Khurdsdnand thus with the abnd'. He cites three instances in
al-Tabarias his evidence. In two of these, the term "shi'a" indicates "partisans"in reference to the ahl Khurdasn, but its use is generic and is not synonymous with abnd' aldawla.57 In the third passage, the ahl Khurdsan are clearly denoted as the ansar and the
shi'a of the regime: ".. . ibta'athakumAllah land shi'atan wa-ansdran."58As before, the
terms are used in a generic sense. This usage does not indicate that everywhere we see
"shi'a" or "ansdr"we can automaticallyconvert them to mean ahl Khurdsanand therefore
abna' al-dawla.59 Elad also mentions an incident occurring in 147/764 under the reign of
al-Mansuirwhere someone says, "O Commanderof the Faithful,thirtymen from the important ones of the Shicawere broughttogether from those whom you [had] chosen."60Taken
out of context, this might seem to indicate the abnd' al-dawla. However, the comment
comes duringa dispute over the succession. The text is describingal-Mans~ir'sappointment
of his heir and the various groups that are intriguing to have their candidate selected.61
Here "shi'a" indicates the partisansin this struggle.62The assumption is that because the
abnd' existed, then all of these terms must have been used to designate them. This is not the
case. They are not equivalentwith each other or with abna' al-dawla. They do clearly indicate supportersof various components of the Abbasid regime; that much is not subject to
debate. However, "abnd' al-dawla" has a much more specific usage. If we start with the
supposition that the abnd' had not formed yet, the multiplicity of terms can be easily explained as indicating a diversity of people.
To elaborate further, one cannot deny that the troops of the early Abbasids are overwhelmingly described as being Khurasanian.However, Elad notes quite correctly that
as a peoplein generalorciviliansof Khurdsdn
is meaningless.
Whoare
[t]hetermAhlKhurdsan
thesepeopleof Khurisin?In theperiodconcerned,a politicalentitydidnot exist in Khurdsdn
(andcertainlynota nationalidentity).Khurdsdn
comprisedmanydistricts,withdiverseanddifferentethnicgroups.Suchtermsas Ahlal-Shdm,Ahlal-'Iraq,AhlHims,etc., in the Umayyad
andearlycAbbasid
period,referto Arabregimentsrecruitedfromthesedistricts.63
This is an importantpoint to keep in mind. This term is a geographic descriptor, in the
same way that "Syrian"is for members of the Umayyad forces. The prominence of Khurasanian generals and troops in the first Abbasid caliphs' reigns is to be expected, given that
56. "Aspectsof the Transition,"101 n. 54.
57. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 345-46; p. 444.1 which reads ".. bi ahl khurdsankhayranfa-inna-humanslraka wa
shi'ataka .. ."; anotherinstance on p. 430.15-16 reads "qdlayd ahl khurdsandntumshi'atana wa ansdrana wa ahl
dawlatand . . ." In this case the first person pluralpronounsshould be read in the sense of the royal "we."
58. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 431.20-432.1.
59. E.g., see al-Tabari,The 'AbbdsidCaliphate in Equilibrium,trans. C. E. Bosworth, vol. 30 (Albany: State
Univ. of New York Press, 1989), 46 (170 A.H.), when those who are conspiring against Hdrilnal-Rashid are described as al-ShiCa,"thepartisans."Bosworthmisses the context andreadsit as indicatingthe abnd' al-dawla, which,
given that context, it clearly is not.
60. Yazid b. Muhammadal-Azdi, Ta'rikh al-Mawsil, ed. A. Habibah (Cairo: al-Majlis al-A'l5 li'l-Shu'tin,
al-Islamiyya, 1967), 200.15-16; see Elad, "Aspectsof the Transition,"10 n. 54.
61. Following al-Rashid's succession struggle, the opposition "infiltrates"Harin's "shica."See M. Bonner,
"Al-Khalifaal-Mardi:The Accession of Hartinal-Rashid,"JAOS 108 (1988): 87, 89.
62. Anonymous, Akhbaral-dawlah al-'Abbasiyah,ed. 'A. 'A. Duri (Beirut:al-TaliaPublishingCo., 1971), 203,
208, 213, 223 is also cited. However, while the term Shi'a is used, it is used as indicatingpartisansof an individual.
63. "Aspectsof the Transition,"98 n. 42.
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this was the region in which the revolt began and where the Abbasids recruited much of
their army.However, this preponderanceof Khurasaniansdoes not allow us to extrapolate
that from the outset, or even in the second generation,they automaticallyformed the collective identity that is representedby the term abnd' al-dawla. I am not arguing that the ahl
Khurdsdnand the abnd' al-dawla are separategroupings; I am arguing that the abnd' is a
subset of the ahl Khurasan that forms during the fourthfitna.
Now let us turn to considerationof where and when the word "abnd'"actually appears.
The firstoccurrenceof abndi'in al-Tabariis "andal-Hazmi al-Sughdiwith a thousandAbnd'
of the Yaman."64As this describes the descendants of a group of Persians who had immigrated to Yemen before the rise of Islam, it does not refer to the Khurasaniansupportersof
the Abbasids. Although this is not in dispute, the point here is that "abnd'"does not always
indicate abnd' al-dawla, and the definitionof a specific usage must be consideredin light of
the context in which it occurs. For example, an intriguinguse of the term that could be conal-dawla is: "andwith him was the armyof al-Sham, the Jaziraand
struedto indicate abnd"a
Mosul. The Banti Umayya collected together their abna-'with him."65The "him"in question is Marwin. This form clearly refers to general supporters,those who were tied to the
household of the caliph. It does not refer to hereditaryproponentsor family and certainly
does not indicate followers of the Abbasids.66This was an acknowledgementof attachment
to the caliph's house, the same claim that was later made duringthe fourthfitna. Crone says
that the first application of the term abnd' is "al-Ya'qibi's statement that 'Isa b. 'Ali waman hadaramin al-abnd' were reluctantto inform cAbdallahb. cAliof al-Manstir'saccession
(in 136/754)."67She dismisses this as an isolated ascriptionand most probablyanachronistic.
It is isolated and possibly anachronisticbut it is tempting to view it, as in many of the cases
to be discussed below, as having a contextual meaning of "followers"as a generic term and
as not specifically referringto the abnd' al-dawla. Elad argues, "militaryunits bearing this
name [abnd' al-dawla] naturally developed a little later, toward the end of al-Manslir's
reign."68He cites al-Dinawarias evidence for this process. A couple of points must be made.
First, the text Elad cites is referringto the reign of al-Rashid and not that of al-Mans~r.69
Second, while it does mention the abnd' ahl Khurasan,this, however, does not indicate the
abnd' al-dawla. As stated above, the abna' al-dawla were a subset of the ahl Khurasan,
but this does not mean that the terms express equivalency. Not all the members of the ahl
Khurasanor abn-' ahl Khurdsdnare identifiedas abnd' al-dawla. Only those who had their
roots in Baghdadand were present immediately before, during, and after the fourthfitna are
referredto as such.
Elad says that the "firstreference to military units made of Abnd' is in 178/794-795."70
He locates this in al-Tabari,but upon examinationnowhere is the term abnd' to be found.71
64. al-Tabari,The 'Abbisid Revolution,trans.J. A. Williams, vol. 27 (Albany: State Univ. of New YorkPress,
1985), 81; al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,2: 1971.
65. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 10.1-2.
66. Lassner,Shaping, 133, has clearly argued,counteringCrone, that the term abnd' does not indicate familial
relationships;however, he misses the broaderconcept that it also does not indicate solely ethnic relationshipsbut
indicates a political relationship,based on ties of loyalty and claims to connection with the caliph's household.
67. "cAbbasidAbni'' 3.
68. "Aspectsof the Transition,"99.
69. al-Dinawari,Kitdbal-Akhbdr,390. This page is a discussion of al-Rashid's succession arrangementfor alAmin and al-Ma'min.
70. "Aspectsof the Transition,"99.
71. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 630.
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Elad assumes that the referenceto CAbdawayh
al-Anbariis an errorand that what is meant is
a reference to the abn~'. As we have seen, however, it is not a mistake. According to Lassner, the earliest indication of a coherent grouping comes with the statement in al-Tabari:
"[w]hen al-Mahdi sent Hartn on the summerexpedition he sent him on, he orderedthat the
secretariesof the abn-' al-da'wah should be sent in to him so thathe could inspect them and
choose one of them for him."72 But in the next few lines al-Tabarirelates: "I examined
carefully the sons of my party/partisans(abnd' shi'ati) and the people of my rule (dawlati)."73The personal pronouns are important.These are the sons of his party and his rule
that he is choosing from, as opposed to the sons of the party of his father or of his father's
rule. These statementsare clearly describing individual supportersof the currentcaliph and
do not indicate that the people that he is talking aboutbelong to a coherent group. They are
categorizing partisansof al-Mahdifor the purpose of a job search and, as in the earlier case
of the supporters of Marwdn, the usage of abnd' here does not indicate lineal sons but
followers.
Crone finds the term croppingup more frequentlyunderthe reign of al-Rashid. "In 189/
804f the Khurasanis asked Harun to replace 'AlI b. CIsawith anyone from kufatihi waansarihi wa-abnd' dawlatihi wa quwwadihi."74Again, the key to understandingthis is to
read it more closely, focusing on the possessive pronouns, kufatihi, ansdrihi, abnd' aldawlatihi, quwwadihi.They are not requestingsomeone from the abnd' al-dawla. They are
requestingthat the Commanderof the Faithful send a replacementfrom "whomeverhe preferred from (among) his competent officials, his aides, sons/supportersof his rule and his
commanders."75They are asking for someone, anyone other than cAli b. 'Isa from the current command structurein Baghdad, to be sent to govern them.
Turningback to Ayalon, he cites a passage in al-Tabarias evidence for the abnd' appearing before the fourthfitna.76However, it says: "'Ujayf b. 'Anbasaand al-Ahwas b. Muhajir
withdrew [along] with numbers of [the] abnc' al-shi'a from Rafil b. Layth and went to
Harthama."77This does not indicate abnd' al-dawla. 'Abna' al-shi'a" indicates "sons of
the partisans."The question that should be asked is, partisansof whom? CUjayfb. CAnbasa
appearslater as a supporterand commanderunder al-Ma'miin.78In reference to anotherexample, Ayalon says "it is interestingto note that al-Rawandi'sfollowers were called Abn&'
al-dawla, after their leader's book, Kitab al-Dawla."79The source for this notion is Ibn alNadim's Fihrist, which says:
72. Lassner,Shaping, 133. Elad, "Aspectsof the Transition,"177, says that the kuttababnd' al-da'wa were the
propagandistsfor the revolution.On p. 99, based on this selection, he says thatthey "constitutedsomething of a sect
with a unique status (the most outstandingof whom, were, of course, the Barmakids)."How he extrapolatesfrom
this to label them a sect is somewhat baffling.
73. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 498.5-6; Crone,"The 'AbbSsidAbnr',"3. Cronenotes that the personwho was chosen
was Yahyab. Khalidb. Barmak,a descendantof one of the revolutionaries.I do not deny thatthose who claimed to
be abni' duringthe fourthfitna most probablywere descended from the "revolutionaries."However, I am arguing
that the point at which these individualsbegan to subscribeto that identity was much later than is assumed.
74. "CAbbisidAbna'' 4.
75. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 703.14-15.
76. "MilitaryReforms,"33. Crone also cites this as evidence for them duringal-Rashid'sreign, "The CAbbisid
AbnSi',"4.
77. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 732.15-16. An equivalentto this passage appearsIbn al-Athir,al-Kamil, 5: 128. There
is no mention of "Shica"or "abnd'."
78. He appearsin al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 1093, 1102, 1103, 1105, 1107, 1108, 1109.
79. "MilitaryReforms,"33.
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andal-Rawandi,
whoproducedtheKitibal-dawla,usedto be his [al-Shaybani's]
neighbor.And
the Rawandiyya,
the abnd'al-dawla,usedto gathertogetherto him andhe [al-Rawandi]
used
andhe wouldsit in themajlisin the
to go purposefully
(onthe)dayof themajlisof Muhammad
mosqueandhe wouldreadit [Kitabal-dawla]untothemandwhena manfrom(among)thefollowersof Muhammad
(would)reada thingfromhis bookstheyshoutedathimandtheysilenced
him.80
Crone calls Ayalon's interpretationof this "mysterious."81At first glance it might seem
strange, but Ayalon has clearly considered the context and has read "abna'" here as indicating followers. The Rawandiyya are equated with an abnd' al-dawla. They are not the
genetic descendantsof the supportersof the Abbasids but very specifically the followers of
al-Rawandi and his book Kitab al-Dawla. 82Ayalon's interpretationstands.
Seemingly, the first use of the actual phrase abnd' al-dawla in al-Tabariis of a man respondingto al-Rashid'sinquiryinto his origins, saying: "I stem from the progenyof the 'sons
of the dynasty'; my family origin is from Marw and my birthplaceis the City of Peace."83
This is Bosworth's translationof this sentence. Now let us look at the Arabic and see what
it says: and rajul min a'qdb abna' hadhihi 1-dawlawa asli min marw wa muwalladi madinat al-salam. This is a much more general statement-"from the sons of this rule," as opposed to sons/supportersof the previous one, with "dawla"referringto al-Rashid's rule.84
This is an assertion of individual connection to the household of the caliph, not a claim of
membershipin an ethnicity or of an institutionalgrouping.This man identifies himself as a
supporterof the dawla, but this is a political assertionof individualconnectivity and spatial
relationshipto a specific ruler, which is then followed by information about where he and
his family arefrom. If this were more than an individualassertionof connectionto the household, it would be much more prevalent in the idiom of identification.
Crone notes a particularproblem with the sources and how to interpretthem:
of theparticipants
in therevolution,
[t]hesourcesidentifytheAbnd'as thephysicaldescendents
andall theindividualsdescribedas Abnd~actuallydidor coulddescendfromsuchparticipants;
theyincludesomeArabs.Yetwiththeexceptionof Qahtaba'sgrandson,thedescendentsof the
arenevercharacterized
mostprominent
Arabparticipants
as Abnd',andone is specificallyexcludedfromtheirranks.85
Crone finds a solution for this in the fourthfitna. She argues that most of the revolutionaries
were settled in Baghdadat its founding. In turn,their descendantswere the ones who fought
alongside al-Amin against al-Ma'miin and thus the term "came to be synonymous with alAmin's Baghdadi adherents;sons of the revolutionarieswho supportedal-Malmunceased
to count as Banawis."86She thus claims that the term was narrowed,from including all of
the ahl Khurasanto only those who aided al-Amin. She argues that they were not only located in Baghdadand that al-Jahiz,Ibn Tayftir,and al-Yalqtibiwere wrong in their assertions

80. Muhammadb. Ishaq Ibn al-Nadim, Kitib al-Fihrist, ed. G. Flfigel, 2 vols. (Leipzig: E C. W. Vogel, 1871),
1: 204.3-5.
81. "'AbbhsidAbna',"4 n. 32.
82. Also see al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 497.1, " ... and indeed we found with him the kitab al-dawla."
83. al-Tabari, The 'Abbdsid Caliphate in Equilibrium, 208.

84. al-Tabari,Ta'nrikh,
3: 672.6-7.
85. "HAbbhsid
9.
Abn,'"
86. Ibid.
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otherwise.87She cites several examples from different sources for this, which deserve examinationbefore we can continue. She finds evidence in al-Kindi for the abnd' in Egypt.88
However, this referenceis not evidence for the abnd' living in or being from anywhereother
than Baghdad, in fact just the opposite: a contingent of abnd' is dispatchedfrom Baghdad,
indicating that this was where they were located.89However, under closer scrutiny,Hatim
b. Harthamab. A'yan was sent to be the governorof Egypt by al-Amin in 194/809-10. Most
importantly,he was allotted "1,000 from the abnd'."90According to this account, this incident took place before the fourthfitna had started. However, this seems to be an isolated
ascription. The term abna' does not appearin any form in the entries for governors under
either al-Rashidor al-Ma'mlin'srule. Al-Yacqtibiprovides informationthat helps to clear up
the confusion. He tells us that Hatim b. Harthamab. Acyanwas dispatchedto govern Egypt
afterthe defeat of 'Ali b. CIsdb. Mahin in the year 195/811 andhe faced people in Egypt who
were calling for changing allegiance to al-Ma'mlin.91
Crone cites anothersnippet from al-Tabarifor evidence of the abnd' in Tarsus.This passage, which occurs upon the death of al-Ma'mlin,is renderedin the translationof Bosworth
as "they entrustedthe task of watching over him to a guardcomposed of men from the garrison of Abnd' [Khurasanians]in Tarsusand others ..."92 The Arabic is "thummawakkalu
bi-hi harasan min abnd-'ahl tarsiis" meaning "then they assigned for him a guard from
This does not indicateabnd' al-dawla. It is likely
among the sons of the people of Tarsus."93
that there were people referringto themselves as abnd' at this time, but this is not one of
those occasions. Crone comments that "not all the Iraqi scholars described as abna' ahl
Khuradsnnecessarily descended from membersof the Khurisini army."94Reading through
166 names under Ibn Sacd's division for Baghdad yields that neither the nisba abndwi nor
the term banawi appearat all.95 The term abnid'khurasan appearstwice; abnd' ahl khurasan appears thirteen times; ahl khurasan appearstwice. Where one would expect to find
the abnd' al-dawla and abnd' al-da'wa in large numbers, there are no references. In fact,
there are only seventeen out of 166 references to individuals who could be construedin the
old paradigmas abnd', which is a strikingly small number.96Importantly,they all died after
the fourthfitna. For most of the individualswho could possibly be interpretedas abna' (ten
of seventeen) immediately following this identification,their specific geographicalorigin is
given.
One entry in particulardeserves closer inspection.
87. Ibid.,9-10: "IbnTayftiralsothinksof theAbnd'as thesoldierswhoopposedal-Ma'mtin
(addingthatthey
ed.HansKeller(Leipzig:
SechsterBanddesKitdbBagddcd,
obeyedhimin theend)";AhmadIbnAbiTdhirTayftir,
Therearemanyreferences
0. Harrassowitz,
thatCronecites
1908),144:"wahumqdmiibi-harbamiral-Mu'minin."
amunableto expanduponhere.However,I havenoteda
whichI havechecked,butdueto spaceconsiderations
representative
sample.Thisis trueforEladas well.
88. "'Abbdsid
Abna',"4 n. 31.
89. Kindi,GovernorsandJudgesof Egypt,147.
90. Ibid.,147.6.
91. al-Yacqiibi,
Ta'rikh,2: 533.
92. al-Tabari,The Reunificationof the 'AbbasidCaliphate, trans.C. E. Bosworth, vol. 32 (Albany: State Univ.
of New YorkPress, 1987), 231.
93. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 1140.12.
94. "'AbbasidAbna',"3 n. 16.
95. MuhammadIbn Sacd,BiographienMuhammeds,ed. E. Sachau(Leiden:E. J. Brill, 1904), v. 7, part2, 66-99.
This generation's death dates span the period from 207/822 to 238/852.
96. Admittedly,furtherresearchin Ibn Sacdand other biographicalsources is needed for a more representative
sample.
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b. Ibrahimb. al-IHurra...andhe was fromtheabnd'ahl Khuralsan
fromahl nasa.
His
father
was
was raisedin
Al-.Husayn one of thosewholeft in thecall of theAbbasids... andal-IHusayn
Baghdad.97
This entryexplicitly describesal-Husaynin termsby which he shouldbe labeled as abnd' aldawla, yet he is not. Why not? Why does he receive the label abn•' ahl Khurasdninstead?
Did he not supportal-Amin? It might be argued that this is a case that shows the terms are
equivalent,but considerationin conjunctionwith the scarcity of usage of the term abnd' aldawla in any significant way rendersthis unlikely. It is importantthat we consider that even
if the sources we have are not representative,at the very least they are diverse enough that if
the terms abnd' and abna' al-dawla were a common identifierfor a socially and politically
significant group of elite players with close ties to the caliphs and which formed one of the
most significant sources of supportfor the ruling structure,then our texts would reflect that
and the terms abnd' or abndi'al-dawla signifying this group would show up more regularly.
The prominenceof usage at a specific point in time (duringthe fourthfitna) clearly indicates
a shift in terminology and meanings.
Crone points out that for al-Jahiz "it is their residence in the capital and implied political
activities there that distinguish them from the Khurasanis.. ."98
Thus al-Jahiz viewed the
.
main supportboth for the Abbasid revolution and for al-Ma'min's putsch as coming from
Khurasanians,and the termabnd' was one way to distinguishbetween the two groups.Crone
opines thatAyalon's paradigmholds up well, except that "it merely so happensthatthe fourth
civil war caused the term to shrink . .. the term came to be largely synonymous with members of the Harbiyya."99Crone's solution can be flipped on its head to provide an equally
plausible alternativesolution. Her argumentrests on the existence of the abnd' as a wellformed social and political groupingbefore the fourthfitna.The mechanismsthat are at work
during the fourthfitna are ignored. Crone assumes that the abndi'who fought on the side of
al-Ma'min would have willingly surrenderedtheir title and status without attempting to
counterthis. 100In this paradigmthe groups are renamedwithout impact and without considerationof what thatrenamingcarrieswith it. Croneobserves, "thedescendantsof Mucdh b.
Muslim, a client of B. Dhuhl who was one of the ahl al-dawla, likewise had ties of fosterShe is using
age with the caliphs, thoughthey arenever explicitly characterizedas AbnaV."'10
this to contrast with Yahya b. Khalid b. Barmak who was an "Iranian"and "the very first
individual to be singled out as" abnd'.102As her evidence for this, she cites that he was the
man chosen by al-Mahdito go with al-Rashidon the summerexpedition.Again I point to this
text with the reminderthat Yaihyais noted as a member of abn~' shi'ati and the ahl dawlati.103He is one of the partisansof al-Mahdi and one of the people of his rule, in a situation that is charged with a fractious struggle over the succession. These ascriptions do not
indicate membershipin a broadergrouping.
97. Ibn Sacd,BiographienMuhammeds,v. 7, part 2, 87.
98. "CAbbisidAbna',"9; also noted by Lassner,Shaping, 132.
99. "cAbbasidAbne'," 10, citing Ayalon, "MilitaryReforms,"7ff., 11, and Lassner,Shaping, 134.
100. Seemingly, this also implies that al-Ma'min's army was made up of Arabs, because as Crone puts it, the
Arabs already "had a prestigious identity" and had no need to assert their status as participantsin the revolution.
"CAbbasidAbnae,"10-11, 9: "The descendantsof the best known ahl al-dawla mostly did supportal-Ma'mln ...
so the only offspring of a famed participantin the revolution to be explicitly linked with the Abna' is CAbdallahb.
b. Qalhtaba.. ." who fought for al-Amin.
101. "Abbasid
7.
.Humayd
Abn,'"
102. Ibid.
103. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 498.6.
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Crone cites Ibn Tayffir'sKitab Baghdad as saying that "theirfathers are the ones who
conducted the revolution."104The text clearly says: wa-aba'uhum hum alladhina qadii aldawla/ and their fathers were the leaders of the dawla.105Again, the claim that they were
descendantsof the originalrevolutionariesis not in dispute. In fact, it was precisely this element that gave their claim legitimacy. It is the timing of when and who began to assert the
claim that is significant.Ibn Tayftiralso relates in the same line that the abnadwere the ones
who rose up and fought against al-Ma'miin in the fourthfitna. 106He makes it explicitly
clear who the abnd' are:they are the sons of the original supportersin Baghdadwho fought
againstal-Malmlin.Croneseeks to accountfor the statementsof al-Jdhiz,al-Yalqtbi, and Ibn
Tayfuirthat the abnd' were Baghdadi, by stating that in the Harbiyya quarter"[m]ost of
them must have been ethnic Iranians.Because these people predominatedin al-Amin's army
and the subsequent opposition to al-Ma'miin,they so-to-speak hijacked the term abnd' alThis and the argudawla, and so a Banawi in the sources is almost always a non-Arab."107
ment that the siege caused the term abnd' al-dawla to narrowmake sense, if we accept that
the abnt' al-dawla as a category and identity existed long before the fourthfitna and that
those residing outside of Baghdadrelinquishedthe title and status without a murmur.
But if this assumption is set aside, we can process all of this informationin an alternative way. Croneis partiallycorrectwhen she makes the observationthat"it was theirpolitical
role which singled them out from everybodyelse. Collectively, they were abnd' khurasanalmuwalladin,people of Khurasdnidescent born 'here', i.e. in the capital, not ordinaryKhurasanis, let alone ordinaryArabsor Iraniansdevoid of special ties with the 'Abbasidhouse."108
I suggest that the Baghdadi descendants of the revolutionarieswho supportedal-Amin defined themselves duringthe fourthfitna as the abnd' al-dawla in an effortto stake theirclaim
to membership in the household and the immutability of their position in defense against
the coming onslaught of al-Ma'mfn's followers, thus making their claim against those who
might take their place.109It is interestingto note that duringthe siege of Baghdadthere was
considerable fluidity, with offers of increased payments triggering defections from both
sides.110We see people who would otherwise have been labeled as abnd' joining up with
Tdhir due to anger at al-Amin's overtures. Crone makes a key observation but chooses to
ignore it: "The Abnd' regardedthe CAbbisidcaliphateas a bulwarkagainstsuch people, who
might otherwise absorb them. . .""I It was this threatthat drove them to find their collective identity and also drove them to collective action. Baghdadand the fourthfitnawas where
and when they formed, and they were thus defined by this context. Using this as our basic
assumption, the assertions of al-Jlhiz, Ibn Tayffir,and al-Ya'qi!bimake perfect sense.
Terminology shifts have meaning and indicate stress on a social system. The abnd' aldawla changed their identification from ahl Khurdsan,etc., in opposition to al-Malmiin's
104. " AbbasidAbni'," 3.
105. Ibn Abi TdhirTayfir, Sechster Band des KittdbBagddd, 143-44.
106. Ibid., 144.1: wa hum qdmiibi-harb amir al-mu'minin.
107. "'AbbasidAbn',"' 10.
108. "CAbbaisid
Abnhr,"13. M. S. Gordon posits an interesting interpretationof the term muwalladiin, "this
is probablyused by al-Ya'qtibito refer to the Iraqi civilian population"("The Breaking of a Thousand Swords:A
History of the TurkishCommunityof Samarra[218-264 A.H./833-877 C.E.]" [Ph.D. diss., Columbia University,
1993], 320).
109. Lassner,Shaping, 134-35, notes that"Baghdadisno doubt suspectedthat a victory for the pretenderwould
enhance the position of the new Khurashniforces.. "
110. Kennedy,Armies of the Caliphs, 79-80.
111. "'Abbisid Abnr'," 14. The bulwarkwas against "Tahir's'ajam [who] were raw Iranians,people who had
failed to transcendtheir local origins by participationin the high culture."
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men. They were staking a specific claim to a place in society, in response to a threatto that
place. The collective "abna'" came together as abnd' at this point and not before. It is not
necessary to go through all that Crone and others have gone through to explain why the
abnd' show up so clearly during the fourthfitna and not before and really not much afterwards. Occam's razorapplies. Before, the termahl Khuriasn had been a more inclusive one.
For the elite of Baghdad, in the face of the opposition of al-Ma'mtin,it was prudent,expedient, and necessaryto narrowthe categoriesof belonging to exclude his followers. What we
see is not just a narrowingin terminologybut a paradigmshift. The definitionsand terminology are changed to reflect a realignmentof forces and groupings.The abnd' al-dawla staked
a claim to status as members of the household as original supportersof the regime, but they
had to do so in a way thatexcluded al-Ma'mUn'sforces while differentiatingthemselves from
the rabble of Baghdad(the "nakedwarriors")that al-Amin was arming.In Egypt the call to
switch allegiance to al-Macmuinis addressedto the ahl Khurasdnand not to the abnd' aldawla.112 The abnd' could not use the regional identity of "Khurasaniness"as ahl Khurasan or solely descent from an original supporter;but these, combined with the locality of
Baghdad, offered a convenient limiter. Thus they are Khurasanianbut different from alMa'mtin's Khurasanians,descendants of the original supportersbut different from those
supportingal-Ma'mun's new da'wa because they remain faithful to the original da'wa. At
the same time, their ties to the dynasty ran deep, unlike the rabble of Baghdadwho rose to
supportal-Amin.
In the ninth century,people, especially the so-called abna', defined their public identity
in relationto the "state"(meaning the ruling body) and their fellow membersof society and
these ascriptions tied them and society together. When the state, in the form of the caliph,
was replaced,these identificationshad to be renegotiated.In the case of the abnd', the identity formed in response to the threatfrom the "usurper,"al-Ma'mun.They called themselves
the abnd' al-dawla as a means of assertingtheir claim to legitimacy and their attachmentto
this caliph (al-Amin) in contrastto a competing claim to elite status. I do not deny the existence of ethnic or culturaldifferences. The question that must be asked is when and if these
are relevant to the motivations and activities of people. The determining variables for the
abnd' collective identity were physical location in Baghdad and specific ties to the caliph.
When they are designatedas the abnd', they are clearly and exclusively inhabitantsof Baghdad.113The claim posits position and opposition. In essence: "We are the abnd' al-dawla,
the sons of the regime, the legitimate heirs to the original supportersof the regime."114"As
a result of this, we are entitled to our privileged access to the bounty of the regime." "We
are not the rabble (the naked warriors)nor are we the newcomers/faithless-ones (sc. Tihir,
Harthamab. Acyan, and their forces).""11The logic appearsto be that if "we" are the physical members of the house, then "we" cannot be removed from "our"positions.
112. Kindi, Governorsand Judges of Egypt, 148.10: wa dandiila ahl khurisin fi khala'i Muhammadwa'l-'aqd
lil-Ma'miin.
113. Ayalon, "MilitaryReforms,"6-7, citing
"Manaqibal-Atrak,"15.2, 6 and Ibn Abi Tahir Tayfulr,
al-J.hiz,
Sechster Band des Kit)b BagdIAd,143-44.
114. E.g., see al-Yacqtibi,al-Ta'Arikh,
2: 547.4-5, in the year 201/816-17: "we are the helpers of your regime
and indeed we fear thatyou will take [rule]this state/regimeby what [is] relatedin it from the directions/guideof the
Zoroastrians."
115. See al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 792.18-793.3: "Andhe said, so what is your opinion about the armies of 'Abdallah?He replied, 'they are a people [who are] on the way of their cause because of the length of their effort and
what they are in agreementabouttheir concern.' And what of their generality [commoners]?He replied, 'they are a
people who were in greattribulationas a resultof the injusticedone unto them. And because they, throughhim, have
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Under the year 195/811, in the account of the battle between Tahir and CAbdal-Rahman,
we read: "'Abd al-Rahmanwas repeatedly saying to his companions, 'Oh Abnd'! Oh sons
of kings, and [those] familiarwith swords!Verilythey are the 'ajam and are neitherthe same
as people of endurancenor steadfastness.'"116 It is a claim to historical connectedness in
"verticaltime."117The term 'ajam does not of necessity indicate "Persian,"but it does refer,
in a pejorative manner,to a newcomer to the community,thus impugning the status of the
warriorsunderTahir's command.118This is an assertionof the pre-existence of a status, not
unlike the claims made by nationalistsfor the historical connectednessof their people. Declarations of this naturetend to have some element of truth;those who were claiming this
statuswere the descendantsof the Abbasidrevolutionaries.However,it shouldbe pointedout
that Tdhir's father was a Khurasaniancommanderand his grandfatherfought on the side of
Abi Muslim in the original revolt, yet he is not identified as one of the abnd'. 119In spite of
what should have been a common bond, origin from Khurasan,the approachof al-Ma'min's
forces signaledthe threatof the beginningof a new regime. These individualschose the identity of the abnd' al-dawla, because it was a claim that they could sustain of physical attachment to the dynasty and to the caliph. Al-Jdhizquotes one of the abna': "[w]e were brought
up by the caliphs and we arethe neighborsof viziers. We were bornin the courtsof our kings
and under the wings of our caliphs. We adoptedtheir mannersand followed their example.
We know nobody else but them and we are known only as their(s) and nobody else's."'20
Here is an explicit claim by an individual, throughthe medium of al-Jahiz, for inclusion in
the entourageof the caliph, statingclearly who and what he andthey were. It was an assertion
that they occupied a place of power and privilege, of which they could not be dispossessed
(even though they eventually were).
Al-Ma'min's new da'wa spelled one thing for the existing power structure,a new dawla.
Al-Ma'mun's followers would expect to be rewardedand the elite in Baghdadknew how. In
this new paradigmthe "abnd' al-dawla" would be superfluous.Also, as with any successful
revolution or upheaval of this sort, in the first period the supportersof the old regime bear
the bruntof retributionand dispossession until the dust settles. It is only then that the new
regime recognizes that it needs the expertise and cooperationof the formermembers of the
old regime. This can explain the process by which the abnd' were broughtback into the fold.
Once he came to Baghdadin 204/819, al-Ma'min recognized that he needed help in ruling

newto themandthey
andof thecomfortsof life, theydefendprosperity
cometo whattheydesireof theirproperty
tribulation
remember
[and]theydo notwishto returnto it."
116. Ibid.,3: 829.3-5.
26.
117. Anderson,ImaginedCommunities,
IslamicTextsSociety,1984),2: 1967.ItindiLexicon(Cambridge:
118. EdwardWilliamLane,Arabic-English
likebarbarians;
and
as meaning]othersthanArabs;... [oftenusedas implyingdisparagement,
cates"[Foreigners,
muchless
oftenespeciallymeaningPersians;]... a mannotof theArabs."It doesnotnecessarilymean"Persian,"
"Iranian."
Therootmeaninghasto do withspeakingunclearlyor poorly,signifyingan outlander
usuallyfromthe
east;see Gordon,"TheBreakingof a ThousandSwords,"49 n. 139,for otherreferences.Also see C. Robinson,
"The Study of Islamic Historiography:A ProgressReport,"Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 7 (1997): 220.
119. See al-Tabari,'AbbdsidAuthorityAffirmed,trans. J. D. McAuliffe, vol. 28 (Albany: State Univ. of New
YorkPress, 1995), 235 n. 1088.
120. Ayalon, "MilitaryReforms,"7. Also cited in Crone, "'Abbisid Abn',"' 16, who says, contraryto Zakeri,
that "they are not boasting of the past relationshipwith the Sasanidemperors,but of their currentrelationshipwith
the CAbbasidcaliphs: kings is simply a synonym for caliphs here."This hits the nail on the head, but Crone does

al-turk"in Rasd'ilal-Jdhiz,ed. CA.S. M. Hrfln (Cairo,
not recognizeit for whatit is. Citing
"Manaqib
al-J.hiz,
1965),28.
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and keeping order in the city. As a result, he made a concerted effort to make peace with
them.
At the beginning of the siege in 197/812, al-Ma'mtin'sarmy was sitting at the gates of
Baghdad afterhaving won several victories en route. Most importantly,this force was made
up of rivals for the positions of the Baghdadelite. The individuals who were to make up the
abna' faced a "legitimationcrisis."121This legitimation crisis forced a coalescing of groups
aroundidentities that provided meaningful responses to the situation and that served to protect status and position, meaning that those who held position and power saw advantagein
coalescing for collective action. 122 In the terminology of Charles Tilly, the claim of alMa'miin and his followers or supportersforced "reactive collective action" on the part of
the notables of Baghdad.123
In addition,duringthe siege those withoutposition and power, i.e., the "NakedWarriors"
saw a way to assert their belonging to the community and their status as defenders of the
faith.124They were acting with "proactivecollective action."125This deepened the legitimation crisis, enhancingthe need to identify collectively for the elite elements of Baghdad.This
does not need to have been a conscious choice, as people are rarely so baldly opportunistic. 126There is no single catalyst for the concrescence of any identity, but for the abnd' the
armybearingdown on them and the siege of Baghdadwere the main impetus for mappinga
new one. This pressure,combined with the armingof the nakedwarriors,meantthatin order
to survive and have hope of maintainingtheir social roles, even if defeated, they would have
to tie themselves to the household and not just to the caliph. This meant that they would
have to stake claim to this position and define themselves as differentfrom the other groups
with whom they were jockeying.127With regardto modernnational identities, Rodney Hall
tells us:
individualsperceivethattheirinterestlies squarelyin thedefenseandpromotionof thiscollective identity.Thefundamental,
evenprimordial,
motive(or "interest")
of self-preservation
will
121. J. Habermas,Legitimation Crisis, trans. T McCarthy(Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), 3-4. In periods of
crisis members of society restructuretheir interpretivesystem, which had allowed them to identify "one anotheras
belonging to the same group,and throughthis groupidentityasserttheirown self-identity."In this process of restructuring, the individuals seek out new ways of assertingbelonging.
122. A. Merlucci, "The Process of Collective Identity,"in Social Movementsand Culture,ed. H. Johnstonand
B. Klandermans(Minneapolis:Univ. of Minnesota, 1995), 48.
123. Tilly, "Revolutions and Collective Violence," in Macropolitical Theory, ed. E I. Greenstein and N. W.
Polsby (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 507: "reactivecollective action: some group or its agent lays claim to a
resourcecurrentlyunderthe controlof anotherparticulargroup,and the membersof the second resistthe exercise of
that claim."And "I suggest that contenderswhich arelosing membershipin a polity are especially prone to reactive
collective action."
124. See Bonner, "Definitionsof Poverty,"343-44.
125. Tilly, "Revolutionsand Collective Violence," 507: "proactivecollective action: some group carriesout an
action which, underthe prevailingrules, lays claim to a resourcenot previously accordedto that group;at least one
group intervenes in the action and resists the claim."
126. L. Greenfeld,Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniv. Press, 1992), 178.
Greenfeldmakes the observationthat "the adoptionof a new, nationalidentityis precipitatedby a regroupingwithin
or change in the position of influentialsocial groups-a crisis of identity,structurallyexpressedas 'anomie'-which
creates among them an incentive to searchfor and, given the availability,adopt a new identity.The crisis of identity
as such does not explain why the identity which is adoptedis national, but only why there is a predispositionto opt
for some new identity."I would add that it is not essential that they choose a nationalidentity, any identity thatprovided salient meaning and supportwould do.
127. See H. Johnstonand B. Klandermans,"The CulturalAnalysis of Social Movements,"in Social Movements
and Culture, 10.
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thenensurethatindividualswill comefullyto thedefenseof thecollectiveidentitythattheysee
128
as fully constitutiveof theirselveswhentheyfeel thatcollectiveidentityis threatened.

People are multifaceted.The collective identity does not have to be the sole form of identification for the threat to cause baseline tremors in the individual's perception of his or her
social reality.I disagree with the notion that it is a purely modern state of affairsthat people
subscribe,unsubscribe,andresubscribeto groupidentitybased on relationshipsand changing
conditions. How a person self-identifiesis determinedby the questionto which he is responding. A person may answer in one context with a tribalname and in anotherwith a geographical descriptor.We all have fragments of identity that we deploy in response to different
situations.129 All aroundus (metaphorically)are artifactsor tools of identity that we pick up
when they are relevant and useful, and discardwhen they are not meaningful. This does not
mean that identities are not strongly held or that they are created out of nothing for purely
utilitarianreasons. It means that they are determinedby the milieu in which a person is located and how that individualinterpretsand respondsto that context. This is what those who
claimed to be the abn-' al-dawla, the sons of the dynasty,were doing. They were picking up
an identity-tool, using it and when it was no longer meaningful they put it back down.
This nomenclatureis not determinedby some sort of cynical, manipulativeconspiracydirected from a central core for its own gain, as ErnestGellner, Benedict Anderson and E. J.
Hobsbawm might be interpretedas saying. 130Clearly identities can be and are used and
strengthened by political leaders for cynical and manipulative purposes, but it does not
necessarily follow that those forces manufacturethe building blocks for them.'31 David
McCrone makes the point that nationalisms, and I would add all identities, are defined and
determinedby individuals making conscious or unconscious choices.132These choices can
be and are reinforced by a government using the tools that Anderson describes: maps, a
pledge of allegiance, a flag, and language.133However, at root, their basic strengthcomes
from personal subscriptions.Everyone is distinct and differentand knows what he identifies
himself as. The trick comes in making the bordersof that identityjust blurryenough so that
he finds a connection with others close enough that they can claim the same identifier and
thus a commonality allowing for the perception of sharedinterests. The blurringcan come
from above, using the processes that Anderson describes but, most importantly,it comes
from within because it serves some specific need or interest.This does not have to be, nor is
it likely to be, conscious. The membersof a social system make interpretationsof their surroundings and of those surroundingthem that allow them to be and to accept others as belonging to the same group, which in turn allows each person to proclaim an identity.134It
128. R. B. Hall, National Collective Identity(New York:Columbia Univ. Press, 1999), 38.
129. See R. Tapper,"EthnicIdentitiesand Social Categoriesin Iranand Afghanistan,"in History and Ethnicity,
ed. E. Tonkin(London:Routledge, 1989), 239: "Culturalidentities,whetherethnic or otherwise, make sense only in
social contexts, and they are essentially negotiable and subject to strategicmanipulations.Individualsclaim status,
presentthemselves, in differentways in differentcontexts. How they do so depends particularlyon power relations,
governmentpolicies, and local hierarchies."
130. E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford:Blackwell, 1983); idem, Nationalism (London:Weidenfeld
& Nicolson, 1997); Anderson, Imagined Communities;Hobsbawm,Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, 2nd ed.
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniv. Press, 1992).
131. For a little acknowledgedsubtletyin Gellner's writings, see his Thoughtand Change (London:Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, 1964), 169. In the same breath as his statement that nationalism "invents nations where they do not

exist" he notes that culturalraw materialsmust be available for this invention.
132. McCrone, The Sociology ofNationalism,

25-36.

133. Anderson, Imagined Communities,113-14.
134. See Habermas,LegitimationCrisis, 3-5, for the seeds of the following line of thought.
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is throughthis process that a collective identity is defined andultimatelysubscribedto. If the
social system thatis partiallyfoundedupon this collective identityis threatened,this presents
a very real threatto the individual's sense of self. If a rupturein the system occurs, one is
forced to reassess his place in relationto othermembersof a collective identityto which they
jointly subscribeand the relationof this collective identityto the social system at large. If the
ruptureis severe enough, the social system begins to break down and members are forced
to re-identify in orderto find their place within that system. If the collective identity's relevancy or meaning is undermined,people will searchfor alternativedefinitionsfor it; if none
can be found, they will search out other forms with which to encode their selves and their
social space.
This, I suggest, is what occurredwith the abnd' al-dawla. They respondedto the threatof
al-Ma'min and his followers. Many of the elite in Baghdadfound interests that they had in
common and coalesced into a collective. Partof this involved defining their relationshipsto
the caliph, to the rabble of the capital, to al-Mamtmin's
forces, and to each other. As long as
theirprosperityand position was tied to the caliphateand there was a clear and presentthreat
to their positions, then there was reason and rewardin acclaiming themselves the abnd' aldawla tied to al-Amin, but most importantlyto the dynasty. Hence they chose the phrase
abna' al-dawla and not abnd' al-Amin. Once al-Amin had been removed from power, the
collective identity of the abnd' al-dawla had to be redefinedor it would pass from usefulness. Each had to acculturateto the new regime and newly redefinedroles, which some of
them did and were reintegrated.However, they were no longer at the center of power and
the designation as members of the abnd' al-dawla no longer held compelling utility. It disintegrated and in its place a host of subsumed identities resurfaced and other choices presented themselves. The individuals discardedthe no longer relevant identifierand turnedto
other alternatives.It would occasionally be used again,but it never held the force or urgency
that it had during the fourthfitna.
Being abna' al-dawla was not an essentializedpartof theirselves, nor had therebeen time
for it to become perceived as such. They could choose to use differentterminologies. It was
only in the face of al-Ma'miin'sforces, which expressly intendedto replacethem at the center
of the Islamic world, that some of the descendantsof the Abbasid revolutionariesbegan to
define themselves as the sons of the dynasty, and in the process excluded al-Ma'mtin'sfollowers from the category. Once the threathad been fulfilled, new identities were necessary
and old ones that had been subsumed were allowed to resurface.The collectivity, made up
of individuals who had come together to form the abnd' al-dawla, splintered into its constituent parts based on preexisting, underlying knowledges of self. What had become the
second tier of identificationrose again to the forefrontand returnedto being primarymotivatorsfor collective action, based on differentcriteria.The abna' al-dawla supra-identityhad
been assertedto fulfill a specific defensive need. This is not to say that it was false, but that
it was "imagined"and the materials that were available were used once they became relevant and useful. Before, they had not been relevant, nor were they afterwards.
THE FOURTH FITNA AND THE POINT OF DEFINITION

Now let us turn to the formation of this collective. Upon al-Rashid's death, al-Amin
became caliph and al-Ma'mln governed in Khurasan.135Several attempts were made to
135. The difficulties surroundingthe succession agreementwill be ignored here. For furtherinformation, see
T El-Hibri, "Hrrin al-Rashid and the Mecca Protocol of 802," International Journal of Middle East Studies 24
(1992).
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convince al-Ma'min to step aside in Khurasanand become a less powerful governor, but
he refused. A tense, nervous coexistence followed for almost two years. Matters became
more heated in Safar 195/November 810 when al-Amin designated his son as the heir and
removed al-Malmtinfromthe succession. In response, al-Ma'mtinproclaimedhimself "imam
al-huda," the "imamof Right Guidance,"drawingan obvious contrastbetween himself and
his brother.136Then al-Amin sent a letter to his commanders in which he listed what alMa'min had done wrong.137The letter made it clear that al-Ma'mln was asserting that in
essence he was caliph. Al-Amin pointed out that this representeda threatto those commanders whom he had just reminded of their oaths and ties of loyalty to him. Al-Fadl b. Rabil
"mentionedconcerning it that no one had a right to the imamate or the caliphate except the
Commanderof the Faithful,Muhammadal-Amin, and verily God did not give to 'Abdalldh
or any other a share of these or [even a] portion."138Al-Amin then dispatchedhis army under the commandof 'Ali b. 'Isa b. Mahan. Al-Ma'miinresponded,afterprotractedwaffling,
by unleashing Tahir b. al-Husayn to fight them. In what might be a trope, Tahir's army is
described as being vastly outnumbered.139Despite this, he defeated his opponent at Rayy
in Shacban195/April-May 811. As a result, al-Malmuinofficially took the title of caliph.
Kennedy calls this "an unqualified disaster" for the Abnd' and that "from this point they
were struggling for survival."'40It was an unqualifieddisaster, but not for a group called
the Abnd'.
There are two accounts of this battle in al-Tabari,but with differing dates. Both of these
deserve close inspection to determinewho took part on al-Amin's side and how their identities were encoded. In the first account al-Amin sends CAlib. CIsawith a large armyforcibly
to bring al-Ma'miinto Baghdad, in silver chains if need be.141' Ali leaves Baghdad in the
middle of JumadaII, 195/March,811.142The armies of Tahir and 'All b. 'isa meet outside
of Rayy in Shacban,195/April-May, 811. Paralleling the battle of Siffin, a truce is called
and some of Tahir's men remind CAlib. 'Isa of his oath of allegiance to al-Rashid and the
succession agreement.CAliresponds in anger at the messenger whom he recognizes, saying
"Oh ahl Khurasan, for he who brings him to me there will be a thousand dirhams!"'43He
calls his troops the Ahl Khurdsin. He does not refer to them as abnd' or abnd' al-dawla. In
a similar way, cAli is characterizedas "the shaykh of the da'wa and the remainder(baqiya)
of the people of its partisans,"'44and al-Amin says that "the shaykh of this da'wa, and the
tooth (nab) of this dawla" will not abandonhis imam.145In this account of the battle 'Ali
b. 'Isa is summarilykilled and a dispute ensues over credit for killing him.146

136. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 796.6.
137. Ibid., 796.
138. Ibid., 797.4-6. His and al-Amin's letter stop just short of labeling al-Ma'min an unbeliever.It is important to note that these commandersare identified as ahl Khurasanand not as abnid'al-dawla.
139. Kennedy, The Armies of the Caliphs, xiii, 50.
140. H. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates (New York:Longman, 1986), 150.
141. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 798.1. It is interestingthat al-Ya'qaibi,al-Ta'rikh,v. 2, 530.13 characterizesthis force
as mercenary.
142. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 797.18-19.
143. Ibid., 801.3-4. In al-Ya'qlbi, al-Ta'rikh,v. 2, 532.6-7, they are also referredto as the ahl Khurasain.
144. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 808.16. In al-Dinawari,Kitab al-Akhbdr,396.7, al-Amin calls him "the Shaykh of
this dawla."
145. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 810.1-2.
146. Ibid., 801-2.
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In the second account, the date for 'All b. CIsd'sdeparturefrom Baghdad is given as the
7th of Sha'bin 195/May 4, 811.147 AI-Amin "called cAli b. C'Is b. Mahan and he assigned
to him 50,000 horsemen and infantryfrom among the ahl Baghdad."148The abnd' al-dawla
are not summoned, only the ahl Baghdad are named. It is at this point that the oath is taken
to the new heirs. In return,al-Amin "gave them, the Banti Hashim and the commandersand
the army, things and rewards"-again no abnd'. 149As in the first account, the two armies
meet outside of Rayy. The battle is fierce, but eventually Tahir's forces begin to carry the
day and 'Al b. CIsa'stroops begin to retreat.As the rout is on, CAlib. CIsqcalls out: "Where
are the companions of the bracelets and the crowns? Oh, ye abna', to the counterattack!"150
He is killed after uttering these words. Interestingly,he said abnd' and does not say abn~'
al-dawla. In this entire encounter, in both accounts, this is the only reference to abn-'.
In the accountof al-Dinawari,al-Amin sends 'Ali b. 'Isa out with six thousandmen "from
the champions of the army [infantry]and their horsemen,"and his armyis described as "ahl
Khurasdn."151At one point in al-Dinawari, before 'All b. 'Isa is sent out, the comment is
made: "Oh, ahl Khurasan, renew your oath to your imam al-Amin."152The supportersof
al-Amin are labeled ahl Khurdsan.Nowhere in al-Dinawari's account of the battle is there
a reference to abna' of any sort.153But when al-Amin is told about the defeat, 'Abd alRahmin is labeled as al-Abndwi and is dispatched with men from the abnd'.154
In al-Tabari, as in al-Dinawari, the next group that is sent out against Tdhir is clearly
labeled as abni'. When the news of 'Ali b. 'Is5's defeat and death reaches Baghdad, "the
people spread false rumors . .. and this was Thursday,the middle of Shawwal of the year
195 (July, 811)."155 Five months after 'Ali b. C'Is's force had been dispatched, another is
sent out against Tahir by al-Amin. This one is led by 'Abd al-Rahmdnb. Jabala. Al-Tabari
informs us that al-Amin "sent 'Abd al-Rahman al-Abndwi among 20,000 men from the
Abna'" and "horsemenof the Abna' and people of bravery,courage, and ability from among
them." 56This time the army is clearly labeled not as ahl Khurasan, as 'Ali b. lisa's army
had been, but as abnd'. This is the point at which the abni' appear,157following the defeat
of al-Amin's best general and with the realization that al-Ma'mtinand his forces present a
very real threat.158 Interestingly,one of al-Amin's commanders says of Tahir: "Andwith

147. Ibid., 818.12-13. Only the year is given in al-Yacqtibi,al-Ta'rikh,v. 2, 532.
148. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 817.13-14.
149. Ibid., 818.11. The march east is paralleled in al-Dinawari, Kitab al-akhbar, 396-98; Ali b. al-Husayn
Mas'tidi, Les praires d 'or, ed. C. B. de Meynard (Paris:Imprimerienationale, 1928), v. 6, 420-24; Ibn al-Athir,
al-Kamil, v. 6, 166-67.
150. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 824.14-15.
151. al-Dinawari,Kitdbal-Akhbdr,396.11-12, 14.
152. Ibid., 393.5
153. Ibid., 396-98.
154. Ibid., 398.15 See above-the reader will remember him from the discussion of the controversy over
whether he is anbari or abndwi. This is when his name changes.
155. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 825.19-21. This passage is paralleledin Ibn al-Athir,al-Kamil, v. 6, 170; De Goeje,
Fragmenta, 325.
156. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 826.18-827.1, 827.3-4.
157. al-Yacqibi, al-Ta'rikh,v. 2, 532.7. Al-Amin's army is encoded as ahl Khurasdnbut on p. 533.2 his supportersare the "ahl harbiyya wa'l-abnd'."
158. Ibid., 530-33. The sequence of events is: al-Ma'min's forces gain controlover almost everythingbut Baghdad, then (Abd al-Rahmanis sent out to face Tlhir.'Abd al-Rahm~lnis defeated, and then we are told "fa-jama'a
ilayhi ahl harbiyyawa'l-abna'." Interestingly,there are only two references in al-Yacqibito the abnd', pp. 530-38.
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him are those whom you know from the infantry of Khurasanand its horsemen. He was
your masteryesterday."159Thir and CAbdal-Rahmin engage in battle outside of Hamadhan.
During this battle 'Abd al-Rahmin encourages his men by saying, "Oh Abna'! Oh, sons of
kings, and [those] familiar with swords! Verily they are the 'ajam and are neither the same
as people of endurancenor steadfastness."160
This is a clear example of the status assertion
that the abnd' were making, defining themselves as an elite in opposition to the other. The
battle is hardfought, but 'Abd al-Rahmanis forced back and he retreatsinto Hamadhanand
Tahirlays siege. After some time, 'Abd al-Rahmanrequestssafe passage out of the city with
his men. Tahir grants it, but as they are leaving they ambush Tahir's forces.161 cAbdalRahmdndies during the struggle, but some of his men escape. According to al-Tabari,they
spreadthe news of the defeat and al-Amin's armies melt away, leaving the path to Baghdad
open. It is then a full year before Tahirreaches Baghdad.After the defeat of 'Ali b. 'Isa, we
begin to see the abnd' mentioned more and more frequently until the end of the siege and
then only sporadicallyuntil al-Ma'miincomes to Baghdad.At thatpoint the numberof references to them declines dramatically.
The threatposed by al-Ma'mlincaused the abni' to coalesce as a collective, but their interests and ties of loyalties were too diffuse to maintain it once the compelling reasons to
identify as such were removed. It was not a group present from the beginning of Abbasid
rule, bound by a sense of ethnic or national ties. It was the subscriptionto an identity by a
groupof militarysupportersof the Abbasidcaliphatebased in Baghdad,claiming special ties
of loyalty to that caliphate and the caliphal household, intended to supersedethe claim that
could be made by al-Malmun's forces. It was a claim driven by a threatto position within
a social system. Once the cause was lost, al-Amin defeated (and dead) and their positions
assumed by al-Ma'miin'sfollowers, then it was politically and economically difficultto sustain solidarity in an identity that had lost its relevance and meaning. The abni' fractured,
disintegratedand, aftera period of social renegotiationof power roles, the individualsbegan
to coalesce aroundthe new caliph and their identities were reconstitutedand adapted.

159. al-Tabari,Ta'rikh,3: 827.20-828.1.
160. Ibid., 829.4-5.
161. Ibid., 831-32.
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